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RETURNING TO THE FAIR USE STANDARD
I.

N

INTRODUCTION

The affirmative defense of fair use “allows the public to use not only facts and
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain
circumstances.”1 Justice Learned Hand noted that “the issue of fair use . . . is the
most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,” largely because it is notoriously
difficult to assess.2 When appropriately applied, the defense of fair use can reach
results that best serve the purposes and goals of copyright law, such as encouraging
the creation of new, original works of artistic expression.3 The defense also provides
a means of adapting copyright law to new technologies.4 On the other hand, the fair
use defense often results in conclusions that undermine the purposes of copyright
law, a growing problem due to a recent shift in the method by which courts have
chosen to balance the fair use factors.5
This Note contends that the methodology of analyzing copyright fair use by
emphasizing, above all other factors, the transformative nature of the use fails to
consider the proper balance necessary to advance the purposes of copyright law.
Courts should not allow the transformative nature of the use to subsume and override
all other factors. Further, this Note argues that courts should limit what constitutes
a transformative use to instances when the new use criticizes, comments, or reports
on the original work in a meaningful way. The term “transformative” cannot merely
mean that the infringer has altered the original work in a way that allows the
wholesale, or nearly wholesale, taking for the same commercial purpose as the
original work.
Part II of this Note discusses the history and development of courts’ fair use
analyses, including the problematic shift toward more frequent, dispositive
applications of the transformative designation. Part III examines the problems that
arise from an undue focus on whether use is transformative; courts’ differing
definitions of transformative fair use; and how the focus on transformative use has
done violence to each of the three other factors. Part IV argues that courts should
return to a true balancing of the fair use factors in accordance with established
principles of copyright law. Part V concludes this Note.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The fair use doctrine in the United States and its traditional four factor analysis
originated in 1841, with Judge Joseph Story’s “fair and bona fide abridgement” test in

1.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).

2.

Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Johannes Munter, Fair Use,
Not Free Use, Medium (Mar. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@copyright4u/fair-use-not-free-use3de0ef9c6e3 (describing the difficulty of determining what constitutes fair use).

3.

See generally 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 (2018).

4.

Id. § 13.05[D][4].

5.

Id.
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Folsom v. Marsh.6 Congress later codified this common law fair use defense in the
Copyright Act of 1976.7 The statutory four-factor test for fair use examines the
following:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.8

Under the first factor, courts today examine whether the purpose and character
of the use “supersede[s] the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message,” such that takings “for criticism, or comment,
or news reporting, and the like” will likely be excused by fair use, whereas commercial
uses will not.9 The second factor considers whether the nature of the copyrighted
work is “closer to the core of intended copyright protection . . . .”10 The third factor
examines whether the “the quantity and value of the materials used” are “reasonable
in relation to the purpose of the copying.”11 The fourth factor reviews not only “the
extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’
for the original.”12
These factors create an “entirely equitable” doctrine capable of expanding with
changes in technology or the marketplace; indeed, it is said to be “so flexible as
virtually to defy definition.”13 The fair use analysis is “an open-ended and contextsensitive inquiry” to determine “whether the copyright law’s goal of promoting the
Progress of Science and useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than
6.

9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (“In short, we must often . . . look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the
use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”); see
also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 719 (2011).

7.

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2017)).

8.

§ 107. “Each of the four statutory factors is the subject of copious scholarly commentary and judicial
gloss.” Netanel, supra note 6, at 720. See generally Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3.

9.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

10.

Id. at 586.

11.

Id. (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348).

12.

Id. at 590 (quoting Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][4]).

13.

Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
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by preventing it.”14 Although the statutory factors are “illustrative and not limitative”
and “provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and
Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses,”15 they nonetheless should form
the starting point for all fair use analyses.16
Shortly after the Copyright Act’s enactment, U.S. Supreme Court fair use cases
stressed the importance of factors one and four—the commercial nature of the use
and the negative effect on the market for the original work.17 In 1984, the Court in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. noted that “every commercial use
of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege . . . .”18 The following year, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, the Court instructed that “[t]he fact that a publication was commercial as
opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair
use,” and the potential market harm is “undoubtedly the single most important” of
all the fair use factors.19
Many commentators’ theories of how to conduct the proper balancing of the fair
use factors also focused on economic considerations. For example, in her article Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
Professor Wendy Gordon argued that the doctrine’s application should be based on
economic efficiency and weigh the social value of the defendant’s use against any
detriment to the plaintiff.20 Accordingly, if transaction costs make it impossible to
license the copyright, or if the use serves an important public benefit, then the use
should be considered fair.21
Over time, however, fair use jurisprudence has shifted away from the presumption
that commercial exploitations that harm a potential market of a copyrighted work do
not constitute fair use.22 Instead, courts today often focus on whether a potential use

14.

Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (first
citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78; then quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc.,
150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .”).

15.

Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78).

16.

See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3.

17.

Netanel, supra note 6, at 721–22.

18.

464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (finding that “time-shifting”—the private, noncommercial use of VCR
technology to tape television shows for later watching—constituted fair use).

19.

471 U.S. 539, 562, 566 (1985) (finding the publication of approximately 400 words of an unpublished
memoir by former President Gerald Ford was not fair use).

20. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,

82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1614–22 (1982).

21.

See id.

22.

Netanel, supra note 6, at 719.
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is transformative as part of its consideration of the first factor.23 This paradigm shift
first appeared in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music in 1994, when the Supreme Court
relied upon Judge Pierre Leval’s 1990 article Toward a Fair Use Standard.24 In that
article, Leval argued that the fair use analysis should primarily turn “on whether,
and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative”—that is, “[t]he use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different
purpose from the original.”25
Leval considered this transformative assessment to be part of the analysis under the
first factor (the purpose and character of the infringing use).26 He asserted that the
policy and purposes of copyright law are advanced if the “secondary use adds value to
the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings . . . .”27 He listed
several examples of transformative use, such as works “criticizing the quoted work,
exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea
argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it,” including “parody, symbolism,
aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.”28
In Campbell, the owner of the Roy Orbison song “Oh, Pretty Woman” sued the
rap group 2 Live Crew for its parody, “Pretty Woman.”29 The Court ruled that the
commercial parody should be analyzed under the fair use doctrine, and ultimately
determined the obvious taking to be protected as a fair use.30 Drawing upon Leval’s
article, the Court noted that the “central purpose of [the fair use inquiry] is to see . . .
whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation, or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering
the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”31 Thus, under the first statutory
factor, one must examine “whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’”32 Further, the Court found that “[a]lthough such transformative use
is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright . . . is
23.

Id. at 745. However, courts also still consider the fourth factor—the effect on the market for the original—
even if there is not a compelling transformative use. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][4].

24.

See 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also Netanel, supra note 6, at 719, 724; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990). Senior Judge Leval, appointed by President Bill Clinton in
1993, serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

25.

Leval, supra note 24, at 1111.

26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. 510 U.S. at 571–72.
30. Id. at 576–94 (outlining the four fair use factors, applying those factors to the facts of the case, and

holding that 2 Live Crew’s parody was protected as fair use).

31.

Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4,901)); see also Leval, supra note 24, at 1111.

32.

Campbell, 501 U.S. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 24, at 1111).
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generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”33 In his concurrence,
Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed with the majority but warned that future courts
applying the Court’s fair use analysis “must take care to ensure that not just any
commercial takeoff is rationalized post hoc as a parody.”34
Even without relying on a new transformative fair use doctrine, the Court’s
ruling in Campbell makes sense. The 2 Live Crew song clearly fell under traditionally
protected parody—that is, the Court correctly concluded that the song “make[s]
some critical comment or statement about the original work which ref lects the
original perspective of the parodist—thereby giving the parody social value beyond
its entertainment function.” 35 Moreover, parody, along with commentary and
criticism, was historically protected under fair use; therefore, the Court need not
have focused on denominating the use as transformative.36
Since Campbell, the Supreme Court has neither issued a major decision concerning
fair use nor provided further guidance regarding the transformative fair use
doctrine.37 However, lower courts have engaged in an “almost limitless expansion of
cases holding uses transformative” despite other factors or considerations weighing
against fair use.38 This elevation of transformativeness from factor to linchpin of the
fair use analysis raises numerous legal and policy concerns.
III. THE PROBLEM

Courts have engaged in a transformative analysis with increasing frequency and
expansiveness. Prior to 2006, transformative fair use defenses were essentially
unavailing.39 Indeed, between 1995 and 2000, of the roughly seventy percent of fair
use cases that considered transformative use, fewer than twenty-three percent found
33.

Id. Transformative works “lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within
the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. (internal citation
omitted).

34. Id. at 600 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, the Campbell majority noted that its holding does not

suggest that “anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the cream and get away scot free.” Id. at 589.
“In parody, as in news reporting, context is everything . . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted).

35.

Id. at 599 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp.
351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).

36. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Parody as Copyright Infringement or Fair Use Under Federal Copyright

Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq., 75 A.L.R. Fed. 822 (2017).

37.

But see Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012) (finding the provision of copyright protection to foreign
works in the public domain did not disturb the affirmative defense of fair use); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (finding the statutory twenty-year extension of existing copyright terms as a permissible
supplement to the First Amendment safeguard of fair use).

38. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 13.05[B][6]; see also Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The

Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 92, 126 (2014). Courts still will not find a
fair use when there is clear harm to the market of the original work. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note
3, § 13.05[A][4].

39.

See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 13.05[A][1][c].
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the use to be transformative; of that twenty-three percent, defendants prevailed just
under eighty-nine percent of the time.40 By comparison, between 2006 and 2010,
just under ninety-six percent of fair use cases considered whether a use was
transformative; of the one half of these cases to have found in the affirmative,
defendants prevailed every time.41
The widespread elevation of transformativeness from just one consideration under
the first factor of a balancing test to a deciding factor means that Justice Kennedy’s
warning in Campbell has become a reality—that is, post hoc rationalizations are often
used to limit the ability of copyright claimants to maintain successful claims, even in
the face of wholesale copying of entire works.42 As discussed below, defendants have
successfully claimed uses of a plaintiff ’s work as transformative by pointing to minor
alterations to the original, changes to the purpose of the work, or even shifts in the
format of exploitation of the work. If transformativeness merely means that something,
or anything, was changed, then fair use—a traditionally narrow affirmative defense—
will become a contested issue in every copyright action.43 Moreover, if any
transformation allows the successful invocation of the defense, none of the other
important statutory factors matter. Recent cases demonstrate these dangers.
In 2013, the Second Circuit found in Cariou v. Prince that, without permission, an
artist’s copying and incorporation of entire photographs into his multimedia paintings
and collages constituted a transformative fair use.44 Defendant Richard Prince took
several of plaintiff Patrick Cariou’s photographs of Rastafarians from his book, Yes
Rasta, and altered and incorporated them into a series of paintings and collages, entitled
Canal Zone.45 The original photographs were taken over a period of five years when
professional photographer Cariou lived in the Rastafarian community in Jamaica,
gaining the subjects’ trust before they would pose for his photographic portraits.46
Relying on Campbell, the court found that twenty-five of the Canal Zone collages
constituted fair use as a matter of law because they “amount[ed] to a sufficient
transformation of the original work of art such that the new work is transformative.”47
However, these takings differed greatly from the use at issue in Campbell. Most
importantly, Prince maintained that he was not commenting on Cariou’s photographs.48
Instead, he claimed “no interest in the original meaning of the photographs he uses,”
and “doesn’t really have a message he attempts to communicate when making art.”49
40. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 755.
41.

Id.

42.

See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 13.05[C][2]–[3].

43.

See Netanel, supra note 6, at 755.

44. 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
45.

Id. at 698.

46. Id. at 698–99.
47.

Id. at 711.

48. Id. at 349.
49. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Thus, Prince’s work does not fall under traditional types of productive fair uses, such
as parody, commentary, or criticism. Nevertheless, in overruling the district court’s
denial of Prince’s fair use defense, the court noted that “[t]he law imposes no
requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered
transformative . . . .”50 For the court, the fact that Prince’s works simply “manifest[ed]
an entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs” rendered them
transformative, which was dispositive in finding them a fair use.51
In addition to departing from the type of use at issue in Campbell, the court
effectively ignored the other statutory factors. For example, when relying on
Campbell ’s assertion that “[t]he more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors, like commercialism,” the Cariou court lent no weight
to the highly commercial nature of Prince’s works, which sold for millions of dollars.52
Indeed, the court intimated that this factor actually weighed in favored of Prince
because his works were so expensive, while Cariou’s works were not.53 In this way,
transformation also overrode the fourth factor of market effect: The court noted that
“[t]he more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that the secondary
use substitutes for the original, even though the fair use, being transformative, might
well harm, or even destroy, the market for the original.”54 Certainly, it would be
difficult to find elsewhere in copyright jurisprudence the notion that the unauthorized
use of a work, which destroys the commercial viability of the original, appropriately
fulfills the purposes of copyright law or the defense of fair use.55 Nonetheless, the
court discounted this factor, finding it unlikely that Cariou would have a secondary
market in licensing his images.56

50. Id. at 706 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)).
51.

Id. The court distinguished the works from each other as follows:

Id.

Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict
the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs[;] Prince’s crude and
jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative. . . . Prince’s composition,
presentation, scale, color palette, and media are fundamentally different and new
compared to the photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.

52.

Id. at 708–09. Prince sold eight pieces for more than ten million dollars, and seven other pieces were
exchanged for extremely valuable artworks by other famous contemporary artists. Id. at 709.

53.

Id.

54. Id. at 708–09 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc.,

150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998)).

55.

While a critical parody or even a bad critical review of a work might harm a work’s commercial viability,
it does not usurp the author’s right to benefit economically from a derivative work that wholly
incorporates the copyrightable content of the author’s original. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92
(distinguishing between criticism that harms demand for the original work and copyright infringement
that usurps the market for the original).

56. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
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As to the second factor (the nature of the copyrighted work), the court did not
give much weight to the fact that Cariou’s photographs were highly creative.57 And
as to the third factor (the amount and substantiality of the portion used), even though
Prince took either the entirety, or the crucial figures at the heart of Cariou’s
photographs, the court found this factor favored Prince because he transformed the
photographs into “something new and different.”58 Thus, Prince’s appropriation of
Cariou’s photographs for the same commercial purpose as the originals was excused
as fair use under the Second Circuit’s analysis.59
More recent fair use case law has also elevated the transformative nature of the
use to subsume the other statutory factors. For example, in the 2017 case of Estate of
Smith v. Cash Money Records, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York applied the transformative fair use doctrine to a “non-parodic”
use that incorporated another work as “raw material . . . in furtherance of distinct
creative or communicative objectives.”60 In this case, the defendants sampled portions
of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted spoken-word musical composition in their rap song.61
Specifically, the defendants edited the lyrics of the composition from “Jazz is the
only real music that’s gonna last,” to “Only real music is gonna last.”62 The court
found the inclusion of the copied portions in the defendants’ song to be “highly
transformative” because they sufficiently transformed the original work’s “dismissal
of all non-jazz music into a statement that ‘real music,’ with no qualifiers, is ‘the only
thing that’s gonna last.’”63 Thus, the court found that the first factor strongly weighed
in favor of excusing the sampling of an unaltered thirty-five-second portion of a oneminute musical composition.64
Concluding that this minimal alteration was so strongly transformative, the court
did not even discuss the commercial nature of the use under the first factor, focusing
57.

Id. at 709–10 (“[T]he nature of the copyrighted work . . . may be of limited usefulness where, as here,
the creative work of art is being used for a transformative purpose.”) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).

58. Id. at 710.
59.

Id. at 712. Cariou also likely had a strong, unpled moral rights claim under the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, which gives the author of a work of visual art “the right to prevent the use of his or her
name . . . in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2017). Prince’s use of Cariou’s
work—juxtaposing his regal portraits of the Rastafarians with naked women—would likely constitute
an impermissible distortion, mutilation, or modification. Further, it would likely hurt his reputation
and ability to find people willing to sit for portraits if it were known that the photographs might be used
in such a manner.

60. 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006)).
61.

Id. at 742–44. The song at issue was “Pound Cake/Paris Morton Music 2” by artist Aubrey “Drake”
Graham. Id. at 743.

62. Id. at 749.
63. Id. at 750, 752.
64. Id. at 749–51.
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only on the extent to which the new work was transformative.65 The court similarly
gave short shrift to the second factor, which it reasoned had “limited usefulness” in
its analysis since it already determined that the composition was used for a
transformative purpose.66 As to the third factor—the amount and substantiality of
the taking—the court found the amount taken to be “reasonable in proportion to the
needs of the intended transformative use,” even though the defendants took more
than half of the plaintiffs’ composition.67 In fact, the court reasoned that the defendants
should be able to take enough of the plaintiffs’ work “to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of
the original to accomplish [their] transformative purpose.”68 And as to the fourth
factor, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ composition “target[ed] a sharply
different primary market than . . . a hip-hop track.”69 Thus, Smith provides a prime
example of a weak justification for allowing a clear taking to be deemed a permissive
transformative fair use.
Further complicating matters, some courts have broadened the transformative
use doctrine, considering not only whether the original work has been transformed,
but also whether the purpose of the secondary work is itself transformative. In White
v. West Publishing Corp., plaintiff Edward White sued West Publishing for uploading
his copyrighted legal briefs to its commercial Westlaw database.70 Finding for the
defendant, the court determined that the usage of White’s briefs constituted a
transformative fair use because White had created the briefs “solely for the purpose
of providing legal services to [his] clients,” whereas the defendant used the briefs to
“creat[e] an interactive legal research tool.” 71 Further, the court found the fourth
factor weighed against White because there was no potential secondary market for
the briefs since licensing them would have been prohibitively expensive.72
Similarly, in the Second Circuit opinion of Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.—written
by the same Judge Leval whose article brought the transformative use doctrine to life
in Campbell—the court found that Google’s digital copying of the plaintiffs’ books
was non-infringing fair use because the purpose of the copying was to establish a
publicly available search function, thus serving a highly transformative purpose.73
The court reasoned that the public display of the text was limited, the previews did
not provide a significant market substitute for protected aspects of the originals, and
65.

See id. at 750.

66. Id. at 751.
67.

Id.

68. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994)).
69. Id. at 752.
70. 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 397–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
71.

Id. at 399. Defendant’s “processes of reviewing, selecting, converting, coding, linking, and identifying
the documents” also supported a finding of transformativeness. Id.

72. Id. at 400.
73. 804 F.3d 202, 206–11 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1658 (2016).
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Google’s commercial motivation did not justify denial of fair use.74 Judge Leval wrote
that “copying from an original for the . . . provision of information about it, tends
most clearly to satisfy Campbell ’s notion of the ‘transformative’ purpose . . . .”75 But
this reasoning completely ignores that the plaintiffs could have used their works in or
licensed their works to a similar service. Further, the conclusion that Google’s fulltext search function did not provide a significant market substitute overlooks the fact
that people wanting to look at key pages or search for particular text might otherwise
have purchased the books.
Authors Guild and White provide prime examples of how a transformative purpose
may be sufficient to escape liability for copyright infringement, even though the
work itself has not been transformed at all. In this way, courts have expanded the
concept of “transformative” in a manner that might excuse almost any use. Under the
broad language of these cases, an otherwise clear copyright infringement—such as
the adaptation of a book into a movie without the original author’s permission—
could ostensibly constitute fair use.
Fortunately, the 2017 case of Graham v. Prince 76 pulled back from a broad finding
of fair use. Photographer Donald Graham sued Richard Prince for infringing the
copyright in his photograph entitled Rastafarian Smoking a Joint, which he had posted
on his Instagram page.77 Prince captured and later reproduced a screenshot of the
photograph, which he obtained from another user who had posted the photograph
without Graham’s permission.78 Prince argued that his work provided a message
sharply different from Graham’s photograph, namely, “a commentary on the power of
social media to broadly disseminate others’ work, an endorsement of social media’s
ability to generate discussion of art, or a condemnation of the vanity of social media.”79
In denying Prince’s motion to dismiss the case, the court found that each of the
statutory fair use factors weighed against a finding of fair use.80 As to the issue of
transformativeness, the court noted that Prince did “not make any substantial
aesthetic alterations” to Graham’s photograph, nor did it “belong to a class of
secondary works that are so aesthetically different from the originals” as to be
“transformative as a matter of law.”81 In essence, Prince took a screenshot of another
artist’s creative work and a user’s caption on social media and attempted to sell it,

74.

Id.

75. Id. at 215–16.
76. 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
77.

See id. at 370–71.

78. Id. at 372–73. Prince enlarged the photo, added a frame, and inserted his own Instagram “comment”

under the author’s original Instagram comments. Id.

79. Id. at 380 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. at 390.
81.

Id. at 380–81.
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concocting a weak post hoc justification that his work commented on social media.82
Although unsuccessful here, such a broad and undefined refuge as transformativeness
provides pretext for a defendant’s commercialized taking that is actually made for the
same purpose as the plaintiffs’ original work.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION

Despite the many problems with making transformativeness dispositive of the
fair use inquiry, there is no question that an appropriate fair use analysis should take
it into account for the reasons stated by Judge Leval and the Supreme Court in
Campbell.83 However, courts eliminate important protections when they fail to
balance transformativeness with the other enumerated fair use factors. Indeed, even
within the factor in which transformativeness traditionally fits—the first factor’s
purpose and character of the use—courts should not lose sight of the statutory
directive to examine the commercial nature of the work.84 While a goal of fair use is
“to prevent the mechanistic enforcement of copyright law in a way that would work
to repress creativity,”85 and to “stimulate [the creation of useful works] for the general
public good,” fair use must ultimately be analyzed in light of copyright law’s purpose
“to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor.” 86 Indeed, apart from the
wholesale copying attributed to piracy and counterfeiting, every new use of a prior
work likely transforms some aspect of it. To distinguish between protected
transformations and wholesale appropriations, each statutory factor must return to a
place of importance in the balancing test.
Accordingly, courts should first look to the second factor’s nature of the
copyrighted work and consider whether the original work was creative or factual, or
whether it was published or unpublished.87 Although traditionally this factor nearly
always weighed against a finding of fair use when the allegedly infringed work was
82. Although, perhaps Prince came up with the justification prior to the taking since he claimed to “spend

more time in [his] lawyer’s office than in [his] studio” while working on this series. Michael Kaplan,
This Artist Is Making Mega-Millions “Stealing People’s Work,” N.Y. Post (Sept. 17, 2017), https://nypost.
com/2017/09/17/this-artist-is-making-mega-millions-stealing-peoples-work/amp.

83. Again, truly transformative works do not “merely supersede[] the objects of the original creation,” but

rather “add[] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message,” such that they promote the purpose of copyright law. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). Thus, “[t]he more the appropriator is using the
copied material for new, transformative purposes, the more it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public
knowledge and the less likely it is that the appropriation will serve as a substitute for the original or its
plausible derivatives.” Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2015).

84. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2017). Indeed, in cases like Cariou, where the

infringing works were sold for millions of dollars, the commercial nature of the work should have been
considered and balanced with transformativeness in the first factor. See 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir.
2013).

85. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277 (6th Cir. 2009).
86. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (internal quotations omitted).
87.

See § 107(2).
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creative,88 the level of creativity will help inform the analysis under the other factors,
including transformativeness. Even in Cariou, this factor arguably should have been
given more weight: Cariou spent years living amongst the subjects of his photographs
and gaining their trust; the resulting, almost regal, portraits were due to Cariou’s
substantial creative effort.89
Transformativeness has also been used to eliminate consideration of the third
factor (the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole).90 Courts once prohibited taking any more of a work than necessary
to fulfill a fair use purpose.91 That rule provided a significant barrier to the wholesale
appropriation of creative expression that impinged on an author’s rights and should
be restored.
For example, in Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., the defendants
copied elements of renowned artist Saul Steinberg’s New Yorker cover—depicting an
illustration of New York City at the center of the universe—in its movie poster for
Moscow on the Hudson, which included a similar illustration of New York City in the
background and the film’s title in the same font as the New Yorker magazine title.92
There, the court held that the defendants’ copying did not constitute transformative
fair use; rather, all four of the factors weighed against the fair use defense.93
Specifically, the court found that the defendants had no compelling justification for
copying Steinberg’s work and “merely borrowed numerous elements from Steinberg
to create an appealing advertisement to promote an unrelated commercial product.”94
While the Steinberg court protected the artist’s unique illustration, one can
envision that, under an analysis that considered transformativeness to be paramount,
a court would likely have excused the taking as a fair use. The defendants could have
argued that the original New Yorker cover made a point about New York City being
the center of the universe, whereas the movie poster made a point about connecting
New York City with Moscow for its film—a transformation of intent. When a
defendant takes a significant portion or the heart of a creative work, the third fair

88. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3.
89. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698–704.
90. § 107(3).
91.

See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th
Cir. 1978) (“[D]efendants took more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader’s mind the
parodied work and those specific attributes that are to be satirized.”); Berlin v. E. C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[W]here the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the
original work than is necessary to ‘recall or conjure up’ the object of his satire, a finding of infringement
would be improper.”).

92.

663 F. Supp. 706, 708–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

93.

Id. at 711–14.

94. Id. at 715.
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use factor should strongly weigh against a finding of fair use, even with a plausible
transformative purpose.95
Moreover, courts analyzing transformativeness have only paid lip service to the
fourth factor (the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work); thus, they have often ignored a key aspect of that factor—namely,
that the market being analyzed is a potential one.96 By its plain language, courts
should consider the effect not only on current markets, but also on future or possible
markets. The expansion of access to creative works in the digital world has made
possible the use of old content in new and innovative ways.97 Campbell failed to give
due deference to this factor, ignoring the developing market for musical sound
sampling that other cases had and have since recognized.98 Even if the
transformativeness of the use is the main factor—and there is no clear reason why it
should be—a taking should not be considered a fair use if it eliminates the viability
of a work in an available market.99 Thus, while a work can constitute a fair use even
if it leads to market harm like a negative review, a work that causes market usurpation
should not.
Elevating transformativeness also risks usurping a specific right under the
Copyright Act—the right to make derivative works.100 Derivative works are “work[s]
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.”101 Only copyright owners have the exclusive right to
95. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to find fair use

even though a poster was only shown in the background for twenty-seven seconds of a television show);
L.A News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining to find fair use even
though only thirty seconds of a four-minute video were taken); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz
v. Colom. Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (declining to find fair use even though only
fifteen seconds of an over hour-long film were taken since the portion taken constituted the heart of the
film).

96. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2017).
97.

See John Palfrey et al., Youth, Creativity, and Copyright in the Digital Age, 1 Int’l J. Learning & Media
79, 80 (2009).

98. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the

developing potential market for musical sound sampling by suggesting that the alleged copyright
infringer either “get a license or do not sample”); see also Matthew G. Passmore, A Brief Return to the
Digital Sampling Debate, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 833, 846–52 (1998) (discussing the process
of digital sampling and how such cases should be assessed under a fair use analysis).

99. Indeed, but for the Court’s strong focus on the fourth factor, requiring consideration of damage to the

serialization rights to Gerald Ford’s unpublished memoir, Harper & Row could have come out differently.
See 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).

100. See § 106(2).
101. § 101. For example, a film based on a copyrighted book is a derivative work of that book. U.S. Copyright

Office, Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations 1 (2013), https://www.copyright.gov/
circs/circ14.pdf.
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produce and authorize the production of derivative works.102 The line between a
transformative fair use and a derivative work is not always clear because “derivative
works seem, by definition, to involve some transformation of the underlying work.”103
Indeed, if one takes the broadest view of transformativeness, one can construct a
plausible argument that every unauthorized derivative work constitutes transformative
fair use. Although most courts have carefully avoided that absurd result,104 as
defendants increasingly rely on the transformative appellation for their taking, one
wonders how long any derivative market can remain within the penumbra of rights
afforded the original copyright holder.
A return to a balancing of each and every fair use factor, including transformativeness,
would bring the law full circle to the genesis of the transformative use doctrine in
Leval’s article. Although he is considered the father of modern transformative fair use
jurisprudence, he advocated for a proper balancing: “The existence of any identifiable
transformative objective does not, however, guarantee success in claiming fair use. The
transformative justification must overcome factors favoring the copyright owner.”105 A
return to the fair use principles discarded in the face of the transformativeness doctrine
would ensure preservation of the Copyright Act’s purposes. When courts take this
balancing approach into account, they demonstrate a far more nuanced and appropriately
deliberate reasoning to reach just results.
For example, in 2014, in Richards v. Merriam Webster, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the defendant’s usage of nearly
seventy percent of the plaintiff ’s dictionary definitions for a free, online reading
comprehension textbook did not constitute fair use.106 Unlike in Authors Guild and
White, the court found that the other fair use factors weighed against a finding of
transformative fair use.107 First, although dictionary definitions are objective, the
court found that Merriam-Webster’s editing of dictionary entries rendered the work
creative.108 In addition, the fact that the defendant copied seventy percent of the
work nearly verbatim weighed against fair use.109 The potential market harm similarly
weighed against the defendant: Users might visit the defendant’s online textbook
instead of Merriam-Webster’s website from which it derived advertising revenue, and
102. § 106; U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 101, at 2.
103. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 467, 468

(2008).

104. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (concerning a trivia

book about a television show); Twin Peaks v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993)
(concerning a guide book to a television show); Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the transformative fair use argument for the creation of a Harry Potter
encyclopedia due to its unfair harm to a potential derivative market).

105. Leval, supra note 24, at 1111.
106. 55 F. Supp. 3d 205, 209–10 (D. Mass. 2014).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 208.
109. Id.
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the defendant’s use had the potential of creating a “negative market effect” on
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary if the unauthorized use became “unrestrictive and
widespread.” 110 Thus, although the defendant’s work exhibited “some level of
transformation,” including “changes in font size, formatting, the insertion of
examples of words used in context, and the deletion of unnecessary words,” this
transformative purpose was insufficient to outweigh the other fair use factors, which
“strongly disfavor[ed]” a finding of fair use.111 Thus, courts can, and should, conduct
a proper balancing of the fair use factors in a manner that best serves to further the
purposes of copyright law.
V. CONCLUSION

Traditionally, courts took great care to analyze and balance each of the fair use
factors to arrive at determinations of this important inquiry. While the law may not
have exhibited perfect consistency prior to the shift to the supremacy of
transformativeness, the degree of deliberation from multiple angles under multiple
considerations allowed parties to raise all appropriate arguments to support their
positions. By reducing the inquiry merely to a question of transformativeness,
nuanced considerations into the nature of the use, the market, and impact on the
purposes of copyright law fall by the wayside. Moreover, the results under this
monolithic analysis do not necessarily provide more predictability—a primary reason
for Judge Leval’s proposing the doctrine in the first place112 —as the word
“transformative” has taken on multiple meanings, preventing consistent and rational
results that adequately advance the purposes of copyright law.

110. Id. at 209 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994)).
111. Id.
112. See generally Leval, supra note 24.

374

